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ABSTRACT 
The Lisbon Treaty emphasizes the EU’s commitment to multilateralism, stating that it ‘shall seek 
to develop relations and build partnerships with [...] international, regional or global 
organisations’ and to ‘promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the 
framework of the United Nations’ (Article 21(1), second para., TEU). One of its key goals in 
external relations is ‘to support and work for effective multilateralism, with the United Nations at 
its core’. However these global ambitions are often not matched by the level of participation and 
representation that the EU enjoys in the UN and the UN system. This contribution examines 
some of the legal and political issues that are at play as the EU attempts to enhance its 
cooperation with and representation in the UN and the UN system. It examines these issues 
with regard to UN bodies that have been identified as targets for closer co-operation and others 
where the EU could potentially pursue upgraded status. It analyses both the EU’s participation 
in the respective fora and the legal and political potential for improving the Union’s status. The 
EU not only remains faced with a series of internal and external obstacles as a participant within 
the UN and the UN system, barring it from taking up its leading role at the global level – it 
currently also lacks a convincing strategy to overcome them. 
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IMPROVING THE EU’S STATUS IN THE UN AND THE UN SYSTEM:  
AN OBJECTIVE WITHOUT A STRATEGY? 
Jan Wouters, Anna-Luise Chané, Jed Odermatt and Thomas Ramoupoulos 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE UN AS A POLITICAL PRIORITY OF THE UNION  
 
The Lisbon Treaty emphasizes the European Union’s (‘EU’ or ‘Union’) commitment to 
multilateralism, stating that the EU ‘shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with 
[...] international, regional or global organisations’ and to ‘promote multilateral solutions to 
common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations’ (Article 21(1), second 
para., TEU). Moreover, one of the objectives of the EU’s external action is to ‘promote an 
international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’ 
(Article 21(2)(h) TEU). The EU being itself one of the most advanced forms of multilateral 
cooperation among states, it is quite understandable that it would be committed to ‘a stronger 
international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based international 
order’.1 The Union not only seeks to participate in this multilateral system, it actually aims to 
have a leading role in shaping it: 
 
‘At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the 
apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been 
linked to UN objectives. We have a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the 
United States and with our partners around the world.’2 
 
A key part of the EU’s engagement in this multilateral order is its relationship with and 
participation in the United Nations (‘UN’) bodies, specialised agencies, programmes, funds and 
related international organizations. In order to play a role in shaping and renewing the 
multilateral system, the EU should also have strong and effective voice within the UN and the 
UN system. 
 
It is also clear from the Treaties that the UN is of major importance to the Union.3 The UN 
tackles a number of issues that fall completely or predominantly within the competences of the 
Union. Furthermore, the UN is a cardinal example of an international organization whose work 
affects a wide range of EU policies. Many of the EU’s key foreign policy goals require some kind 
of engagement with the UN and the UN system. These include issues such as climate change 
policy, eradication of global poverty, humanitarian assistance and security issues such as Iran’s 
nuclear aspirations and combating arms proliferation. Thus, achieving an effective 
representation of the Union in the UN and the UN system is in the interest of the EU, and is a 
significant political priority.  
 
Despite being a priority, the cooperation of the EU with the UN encounters several stumbling 
blocks that at times hamper the EU’s efforts to have a unified and effective presence within the 
                                               
1
 European Council, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12 December 2003. 
2
 Council of the European Union, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing 
World, S407/08, 11 December 2008, p. 2. For a survey of scholarly literature on the EU’s commitment to multilateralism see R. 
KISSACK, The European Union and multilateralism, in « Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: 
Performance, policy, power », K.E. JØRGENSEN and K.V. LAATIKAINEN (ed.) London, New York (Routledge), 2013, 405-415. 
3
 Apart from the reference in Art. 21(1) TEU, the UN/UN Charter is being referred to in 14 other instances in the EU Treaties: Art. 
3(5), Art. 21(2)(c), Art. 34(2), Art. 42(1) and (7) TEU, 7
th
 recital of the preamble of the TFEU, Art. 208(2), Art. 214(7), Art. 220(1) 
TFEU, 3
th
 and 8
th
 recital preamble, as well as Art. 1(b) Protocol No 10 on permanent structured cooperation, 3th paragraph 
Declaration No 13 concerning CFSP, Declaration No 14 concerning CFSP. 
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organization. One of the most contentious issues in this respect is the division of powers 
between the EU and its Member States, most notably with regard to the right to speak or the 
right to negotiate international agreements. These issues of external representation are 
aggravated by the variation of statuses that the EU has in the different UN fora. While there are 
several bodies in which only the EU Member States are represented, the EU has obtained 
observer status in most fora, was given enhanced participation rights in some, and was even 
granted the status of a member organization in very few exceptional cases.4 The type of status 
depends not only on the competences of the EU, but also on the institutional framework of the 
respective UN bodies, which is in turn contingent upon the political circumstances. 5 
Consequently, the EU’s status in UN fora does not necessarily correspond to its competences 
and priorities, thereby hindering its effective representation.  
 
In light of these shortcomings, European Commission President Barroso and Vice-President 
Ashton issued on 20 December 2012 a ‘Strategy for the progressive improvement of the EU 
status in international organisations and other fora in line with the objectives of the Treaty of 
Lisbon’,6 (‘Barroso-Ashton Strategy’ or ‘Strategy’) which contains a number of recommendations 
concerning EU representation in international organizations, including the UN framework. 
Firstly, with regard to the EU’s work in the UN General Assembly (‘UNGA’), the Strategy 
recommends continued efforts to ensure the full implementation of UNGA Resolution 65/276 on 
the enhanced participation rights of the Union, as well as an evaluation of its possible extension 
to other UNGA subsidiary bodies. Secondly, with regard to other UN agencies and programmes, 
the Strategy makes a classification of the various situations, based on the potential for a status 
upgrade and on whether or not efforts are currently being undertaken. For each situation, 
recommendations and examples are provided, often indicating a number of priority 
organizations. 
 
The present contribution examines some of the legal and political issues that are at play as the 
EU attempts to enhance its cooperation with and representation in the UN and the UN system. 
Section II deals with general issues of EU external representation, which have recently played a 
major role in EU-UN relations. Section III analyses difficulties with regard to the practical 
implementation of UNGA Resolution 65/276 as well as the possibility to extend its application to 
UNGA subsidiary bodies, using the example of the Human Rights Council (‘HRC’ or ‘Council’). 
Section IV takes a closer look at UN bodies that were identified as targets for closer co-
operation in the Barroso-Ashton-Strategy and where the EU could potentially pursue upgraded 
status, analysing both the EU’s participation in the respective fora and the legal and political 
potential for improving the Union’s status. Our analysis focuses on a series of UN bodies which 
illustrate the institutional diversity within the UN and the UN system – ranging from primary 
organs to subsidiary bodies, specialized agencies and independent organizations whose 
relationship with the UN is governed by special agreements – and the broad range of issue 
areas where the EU is involved internationally: human rights, food and agriculture, transport, 
security, science and culture. In addition to the UNGA and the HRC, the paper examines the 
cases of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which is the only example of a UN 
specialized agency in which the EU holds membership status; the International Maritime 
                                               
4
 F. HOFFMEISTER, Outsider or Frontrunner? Recent Developments under International and European Law on the Status of the 
European Union in International Organizations and Treaty Bodies, CMLRev 2007, 41-68. 
5
 C. FLAESCH-MOUGIN, Le statut de la Communauté Européenne au sein des organisations internationales, in « Commentaire J. 
Mégret: Le Droit de la CE et de l’Union Européenne », Vol. 12: Relations extérieures, J.-V. LOUIS and M. DONY (ed.) Brussels 
(Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles), 2005, 369-397, 369 et seq. 
6
 Communication to the Commission from the President in Agreement with Vice-President Ashton – Strategy for the progressive 
improvement of the EU status in international organisations and other fora in line with the objectives of the Treaty of Lisbon, C(2012) 
9420 final, 20 December 2012. 
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Organization (IMO), a UN specialized agency in which the EU holds no status despite its prolific 
legislative and policy initiatives in maritime affairs; the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), where the EU’s external representation is complicated by the continuing existence of the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom); and finally the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), as an example of a UN specialized agency in a 
policy field of ‘weak’ EU powers but where the EU has nevertheless been granted an ‘ad hoc’ 
upgraded status for a specific purpose. Thus, this contribution does not intend to give an 
exhaustive account of the UN bodies and organizations where the EU might pursue closer co-
operation or an upgraded status; rather, it aims to illustrate the legal and political challenges that 
the Union encounters when it seeks to improve its status in the UN framework. 
 
We argue that even after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty which aimed to streamline the 
Union’s external representation, the EU continues to struggle for more effective participation in 
the UN framework. The stumbling blocks are both internal – due to disagreements between the 
Union and its Member States – and external – in particular due to gaps between the EU’s status 
in most UN bodies and its competences and priorities. Although aligning the Union’s internal 
and external dimensions thus remains a focal point of the EU’s engagement at the UN, this 
contribution aims to demonstrate that the Barroso-Ashton Strategy to achieve this goal lacks the 
required level of vision and precision, and is thus inadequate for guiding the EU’s efforts 
towards assuming its desired leadership role at the UN level. 
 
II. EU REPRESENTATION AT THE UN AFTER LISBON 
 
The EU’s representation in multilateral fora has long been a contentious issue. The Lisbon 
Treaty had intended to deal with some of the obstacles that plagued EU external relations. 
However, problems have persisted, and the EU’s relationship with the UN has not been immune 
to this.7 Much of this can be traced to the fact that the EU can be only a full member in some of 
these organizations and instruments and cannot be a full member of the UN in general.8 It 
therefore must rely on and co-operate with the EU Member States, who are full members of the 
UN and of most UN specialized agencies.  
 
In order to ensure unity in the international representation of the Union,9 the Member States and 
the Union have the duty to cooperate closely in their activities at the UN level.10 This entails 
                                               
7
 S. GSTÖHL, EU Diplomacy After Lisbon: More Effective Multilateralism?, Brown Journal of World Affairs 2011, 181-191; N. 
HADESHIAN, European Union's External Relations: More Consistency?, Yearbook of Polish European Studies 2010, 107-127; N. 
HELWIG, EU Foreign Policy and the High Representative’s Capability-Expectations Gap: A question of Political Will, European 
Foreign Affairs Review 2013, 235–254. 
8
 Cf. Art. 4(1) UN Charter, which limits membership to states only. For literature examining the status and representation 
arrangements of the EU in different international organizations in accordance with the founding instrument of each organization, see 
M. EMERSON, R. BALFOUR, T. CORTHAUT, J. WOUTERS, P.M. KACZYNSKI and T. RENARD, Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor: 
Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy, Brussels (Centre for European Policy Studies), 2011; HOFFMEISTER, 
supra, n. 4. 
9
 On the ‘requirement’ or ‘principle’ of unity in the international representation of the EU see inter alia European Court of Justice 
(‘ECJ’), Case 1/78, IAEA, [1978] ECR 2151, para. 34-36; ECJ, Opinion 2/91, ILO, [1993] ECR I-1061, para. 38; ECJ, Opinion 1/94, 
WTO, [1994] ECR I-5267, para. 108; ECJ, Case C-25/94, Commission v Council, [1996] ECR I-1469, para. 48; ECJ, Case 
C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden, [2010] ECR I-3317, paras 73, 104. 
10
 The case-law of the ECJ has so far not established complete clarity on the legal foundations of the duty of cooperation in the 
Union’s external relations. While the ECJ has frequently held that the ‘obligation to cooperate flows from the requirement of unity in 
the international representation of the Community’ (see e.g. ECJ, Opinion 1/94, supra, n. 9, para. 108; Case C-25/94, supra, n. 9, 
para. 48; C-246/07, supra, n. 9, para. 73), commentators interpret the recent judgments in the cases C-459/03, Commission v 
Ireland, [2006] ECR I-4635 and C-246/07, supra, n. 9, to support the view that the Court derives the duty from the principle of 
sincere cooperation, enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU. See C. HILLION, Mixity and Coherence in EU External Relations: The Significance of 
the ‘Duty of Cooperation’, in « Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the World », C. HILLION and P. 
KOUTRAKOS (ed.) Oxford (Hart), 2010, 87-115, 91-92; F. CASOLARI, The principle of loyal co-operation: A ‘master key’ for EU 
external representation?, in « Principles and practices of EU external representation », S. BLOCKMANS and R.A. WESSEL (ed.) 
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among others that Member States must collectively submit a Union position, whenever a matter 
in a UN body in which the EU does not have member status, falls in an area of exclusive EU 
competence.11 Member States are not entitled to table unilateral proposals, even in areas of 
shared competences, when the Union has remained passive pursuant to a common strategy not 
to submit a proposal.12  
 
An issue that has prominently manifested itself in the UN has been the question in whose 
names statements are to be made. In particular, disagreement centred on the seemingly trivial 
issue of whether statements before the UN should be preceded by a short clause indicating if 
the statement was delivered “on behalf of the EU”, “on behalf of the EU and its Member States”, 
or “on behalf of the Member States of the European Union”. In the second half of 2011, the 
United Kingdom blocked a significant number of EU statements in an ostensible attempt to 
safeguard its national competences in the field of shared competences,13 thereby considerably 
impacting on the EU’s external action. 14  The adoption of ‘general arrangements’ on EU 
statements in multilateral organizations by the Council on 24 October 201115 has ended the 
conflict for now, but these arrangements are far from offering a permanent solution. Their 
provision that ‘Member States agree on a case-by-case basis whether and how to co-ordinate 
and be represented externally’16 immediately triggered criticism by the Commission17 and risks 
creating confusion for third countries regarding the allocation of competences within the EU.18  
 
Other disagreements with regard to the delivery of statements have focused on the use of 
nameplates. When the Commission proposed in 2013 that EU or common statements in the 
FAO should in the future only be delivered from behind the EU nameplate, 19  the United 
Kingdom disagreed, favoring the current practice according to which ‘any Member State may 
intervene in support of an agreed EU statement from behind their national nameplate’.20 It 
highlights the unease with which some Member States react whenever the EU advances into 
territory previously reserved to state actors, and illustrates their latent fear of competence creep. 
                                                                                                                                                       
CLEER Working Papers 2012/5, 11-36; M. CREMONA, Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden (PFOS), Judgment of the Court of 
Justice (Grand Chamber) of 20 April 2010, nyr., Common Market Law Review 2011, 1639-1666, 1650 et seq. 
11
 ECJ, Case C-45/07, Commission v. Greece, [2009] ECR I-701, para. 14-38. 
12
 ECJ, Case C-246/07, Commission v. Sweden, [2010] ECR I-3317, para. 69-105; G. DE BAERE, “O, Where is Faith? O, Where is 
Loyalty?” Some Thoughts on the Duty of Loyal Co-operation and the Union’s External Environmental Competences in the light of 
the PFOS Case, European Law Review 2011, 405-419. 
13
 T. VOGEL, Split Emerges over Remit of the EU’s Diplomatic Service, 2011, European Voice, 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/split‐emerges‐over‐remit‐of‐the‐eu‐s‐diplomatic‐service/71168.aspx (16 February 
2014); J. BORGER, EU Anger over British Stance on UN Statements, 2011, The Guardian, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/uk-eu-un-statements-wording (16 February 2014); S. BARKOWSKI and K. WIATR, 
External Representation of the European Union and Shared Competences – an Unsolved Puzzle, Yearbook of Polish European 
Studies 2012, 155-175, 166 et seq. 
14
 European External Action Service, Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission, 22 December 2011, point 17.  
15
 Council of the European Union, EU Statements in Multilateral Organisations – General Arrangements, Doc. No. 15901/11, 24 
October 2011 (‘General Arrangements’). For a commentary see C. FLAESCH-MOUGIN, Représentation externe et compétences de 
l’Union européenne: quelques réflexions à propos des arrangements généraux du Conseil relatifs aux déclarations de l’UE dans les 
organisations multilatérales, in « La Constitution, l’Europe et le droit – Mélanges en l’honneur de Jean-Claude Masclet », C. 
BOUTAYEB (ed.) Paris (Publications de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne), 2013, 571–592. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Statement by the Commission to be entered into the minutes of the Council session endorsing the General Arrangements, 
Council of the European Union, EU Statements in Multilateral Organisations – General Arrangements, supra, n. 15. 
18
 See further T. RAMOPOULOS and J. ODERMATT, EU Diplomacy: Measuring Success in Light of the Post-Lisbon Institutional 
Framework, in « Global Power Europe », Vol. 1: Theoretical and Institutional Approaches to the EU’s External Relations, A. 
BOENING et al (ed.) Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, London (Springer), 2013, 19-35, 27 et seq. 
19
 Communication from the Commission to the Council, The role of the European Union in the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) after the Treaty of Lisbon: Updated Declaration of Competences and new arrangements between the Council and the 
Commission for the exercise of membership rights of the EU and its Member States, COM(2013) 333 fin, annex 2, p. 13 (‘FAO 
Communication’). 
20
 United Kingdom, Department for International Development, Explanatory Memorandum on COM (2013) 333 final, Doc. No. 
10368-13, 27 June 2013, para. 17. 
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The negotiation of international agreements is another case where similar problems arose with 
regard to representation in the post-Lisbon era, particularly in areas of shared competences.21 
In negotiations on a legally binding instrument on mercury, for example, the Commission held 
the view that it should be the negotiator on all Union competences, including shared ones, 
having to cooperate closely with the Member States. The Council on the other hand opted for a 
negotiating team comprising of the Commission and the Presidency as a means to attain unity 
of representation. The current compromise foresees that the Commission will be the Union 
negotiator in areas where the Union has competence and has acted upon it, but that it will do so 
‘in consultation with a special committee of representatives of Member States, and in 
accordance with [specific] negotiating directives’.22 
 
The EU has managed to overcome many of these representation issues, mostly due to the 
desire of the Member States and the EU institutions to work together to find practical 
arrangements. Nevertheless, the representation problems that were exhibited in the post-Lisbon 
period were never fully settled, and could possibly arise again in the future. 
 
III. THE EU AT THE UNGA AND THE HRC: UNGA RESOLUTION 65/276 AND ITS AFTERMATH 
 
The issues regarding EU representation discussed above are further aggravated by the 
incoherent picture of EU status at the level of the UN and the UN system. Across the wide range 
of UN bodies, the Union holds a variety of different legal statuses, ranging from no 
representation to full membership. As indicated above, the level of status depends not only on 
the competences of the EU but also on external factors, such as the institutional framework of 
the respective UN bodies and the political context.23 This leads to the situation whereby the 
EU’s status at UN bodies is not necessarily in line with its competences and priorities. Thus the 
EU frequently has very limited participation rights in those UN fora which are of high relevance 
for the effective exercise of its powers. Consequently, the Union has continuously pursued the 
objective of improving its representation at UN bodies. 
 
One of the most prominent examples of such efforts is the 2011 upgrade of the EU’s observer 
status at the UNGA. The Union had already been actively engaged at the UNGA for decades, 
ever since the European Economic Community (‘EEC’) was invited to participate as an 
observer.24 In light of the UNGA’s high visibility and its rank as the premier forum to address the 
global community of states, it appeared to be the natural setting for the EU to seek an upgraded 
status.25 Being one of the UN’s primary organs, it was hoped that a status change in the UNGA 
would set a precedent for realigning the Union’s participation rights in other UN bodies with its 
                                               
21
 See for example on the negotiations of a legally binding instrument on mercury T. CORTHAUT and D. VAN EECKHOUTTE, Legal 
Aspects of EU Participation in Global Environmental Governance under the UN Umbrella, in « The European Union and Multilateral 
Governance », J. WOUTERS et al (ed.) Basingstoke (Palgrave Macmillan), 2012, 145-170; G. DE BAERE, International Negotiations 
Post-Lisbon: A Case Study of the Union’s External Environmental Policy, in « The European Union’s External Relations a Year After 
Lisbon », K. KOUTRAKOS (ed.) CLEER Working Papers 2011/3, 97–112, 
http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/772011_51358CLEER%20WP%202011-3%20-%20KOUTRAKOS.pdf. Similar 
disagreements were observed with regard to the negotiation of the Arms Trade Treaty, see Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 
Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union: Foreign Policy, 22 July 2013, 40, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/227437/2901086_Foreign_Policy_acc.pdf, 38-39. 
22
 Council Decision on the participation of the Union in negotiations on a legally binding instrument on mercury further to Decision 
25/5 of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Doc. No. 16632/10, 6 December 2010. 
23
 FLAESCH-MOUGIN, supra, n. 5. 
24
 UNGA Res. 3208 (XXIX) 1974, Status of the European Economic Community in the General Assembly, 11 October 1974. 
25
 Cf. G. DE BAERE and E. PAASIVIRTA, Identity and Difference: The EU and the UN as Part of Each Other, in « The Emergence of 
the European Union’s International Identity – Views from the Global Arena », H. DE WAELE and J.J. KUIPERS (ed.), Leiden, Boston 
(Martinus Nijhoff), 2013, 21-42, 26. 
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new internal institutional realities after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The Union aimed 
for an ‘enhanced’ observer status which would allow the EU, as far as possible, to be 
represented in the UNGA in its own right instead of through the Member State holding the 
rotating Council Presidency. Diplomatic efforts suffered a serious setback in September 2010 
when a first draft resolution was met with opposition by third states and failed to be adopted.26 It 
was only after increased outreach and substantive amendments that the UNGA adopted 
Resolution 65/276 on 3 May 2011 and saved the EU from a diplomatic debacle.27 Still, the EU 
achieved far less than it had initially intended, as the final Resolution secured participation rights 
that were far lower than what had been proposed at the outset.  
 
A. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION  
 
Even though UNGA Resolution 65/276 was eventually adopted with a large majority voting in 
favour, its implementation in practice presented new challenges. Based on lingering concerns of 
endangering the principle of sovereign equality of the UN’s Member States and the 
intergovernmental character of the organization, a number of States, most vocally the 
CARICOM group, advocated a narrow interpretation of the Resolution. The disagreement 
centred in particular on the Union Delegation’s right ‘to be inscribed on the list of speakers 
among representatives of major groups, in order to make interventions’. 28  This had been 
interpreted by the UN Secretary-General (‘UNSG’) to mean that the EU shall be inscribed ‘in the 
order in which the European Union signified its desire to speak’.29 In an interpretive declaration 
of UNGA Resolution 65/276 CARICOM stated that it did not share the UNSG’s interpretation, 
expressing the view that the Union should not take ‘priority over other major groups that are 
represented by a State member of the United Nations’.30 In order to maintain the clear hierarchy 
between states and observers, CARICOM concluded that ‘in a speakers’ list including multiple 
major groups, the European Union will not be able to speak prior to any major group 
represented by a full State Member of the United Nations’.31  
 
The controversy had practical consequences when UNGA Resolution 65/276 was applied in the 
UNGA’s 66th session. Speaking in the Third Committee, the representative of CARICOM 
reiterated its view, arguing that the UNSG’s interpretation ‘would appear to confer even more 
enhanced privileges to the European Union’s observer’. 32  His view was shared by the 
representatives of Venezuela and Nicaragua. Poland on the other hand rejected any unilateral 
interpretation of the ‘crystal clear’ text of the Resolution, while the United States stated that the 
EU Member States should be able to decide who would speak on their behalf.33 In an attempt to 
resolve the disagreement, the Chair of the Third Committee launched open-ended consultations 
and, as an interim measure, decided to rotate the speaking order of the representatives of major 
                                               
26
 See M. EMERSON and J. WOUTERS, The EU’s Diplomatic Debacle at the UN: What else and what next?, Commentary, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 1 October 2010.  
27
 On the diplomatic saga involving the EU’s upgraded status at the UNGA see E. BREWER, The Participation of the European Union 
in the Work of the United Nations: Evolving to Reflect the New Realities of Regional Organizations, International Organizations Law 
Review 2012, 181-225; DE BAERE and PAASIVIRTA, supra, n. 25; J. WOUTERS, J. ODERMATT and T. RAMOPOULOS, The Status of the 
European Union at the United Nations General Assembly, in « The European Union in the World: Liber Amicorum Professor Marc 
Maresceau », I. GOVAERE, E. LANNON, P. VAN ELSUWEGE, S. ADAM (ed.), Leiden (Brill Publishers), 2014, 211-223. 
28
 UNGA Res. 65/276, Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations, 3 May 2011, annex Art. 1(a). 
29
 Note by the Secretary-General, Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations, A/65/856, para. 5. 
30
 Letter dated 9 May 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Bahamas to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, A/65/834. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
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groups in order to avoid setting a precedent.34 Nevertheless, the dispute could not be settled, 
and escalated in a later meeting which had to be postponed when consensus on the list of 
speakers could not be obtained.35 Subsequent consultations led to an additional hardening of 
the respective positions and the Chair’s proposal that representatives of major groups could 
informally swap their places if they wanted to speak earlier, was met with hesitation.36 A similar 
conflict erupted in the Fifth Committee, when the EU intended to take the floor after Argentina 
for the G77 and China, which initially resulted in having the EU speak after all regional groups.37 
Other Committees, however, established pragmatic solutions apparently without opposition, 
such as the Second Committee, where inscription of the major groups on the list of speakers 
was made on a ‘first-come, first-served basis’.38 For the time being, the issue appears to have 
been settled and the Union Delegation regularly speaks before other major groups represented 
by states. Yet, without a common understanding about the scope of UNGA Resolution 65/276, 
the disagreement about its accurate interpretation results in unequal application across the 
UNGA’s Main Committees and may cause further discussions in the future. 
 
Another conflict focused on the right to submit an explanation of vote. It was argued by some 
Member States that this right could only be exercised by those entities that had a right to vote, 
given that the two rights were inextricably linked.39 It would thus fall again to the EU Member 
States to submit explanatory statements on behalf of the EU. In some cases the EU was 
granted the right to make a ‘general statement’ after the State Parties had delivered their 
explanations of vote; however, this practice has equally triggered criticism. When the UNGA 
President in a meeting on Resolution 65/281 gave the floor to the EU representative to make a 
general statement, the representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, supported by 
Venezuela, raised a point of order, arguing that the Union should not be granted the exclusive 
privilege to make a general statement, when the same right was denied to Member States, and 
reiterating the view that the EU ‘would not be able to speak after the vote since it had no vote’.40 
 
Other difficulties in the practical implementation of Resolution 65/276 stemmed from the EU’s 
allocation of competences and its external relations architecture. This includes the 
abovementioned disagreement between the United Kingdom and the Union on the question in 
whose name statements ought to be delivered, and the oftentimes inconsistent external 
representation, alternatively by the EU Delegation or by the Member State holding the rotating 
Council Presidency on its behalf.41 
 
These hurdles prompted President Barroso and Vice-President Ashton to call for continued 
efforts to ensure the full implementation of the Resolution in their Strategy.42 Nevertheless, 
despite certain setbacks, the overall application can be judged a success. 43  The Union 
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Delegation has smoothly assumed its new responsibilities, EU representatives regularly address 
the plenary and the Committees, and Union communications are directly circulated as official 
documents. It is in this light that the President of the Commission and the HR/VP concluded in 
2013: ‘By now, the EU’s enhanced participatory status in the work of UNGA, its committees and 
conferences, is broadly accepted at the UN; internal debates have largely subsided, although 
practical implementation requires permanent attention and vigilance by the EU Delegation in 
New York’.44 
 
The EU’s experience surrounding the 2011 upgrade at the UNGA not only demonstrates the 
challenges in seeking enhanced participation rights in the UN, it has been highly influential in 
shaping EU policy towards international organizations ever since. It is now clear that for the 
Union securing upgraded status in international organizations is neither simple nor automatic, 
but requires a serious and careful diplomatic effort that takes into account the political 
sensitivities of third states, and even of the EU’s own Member States. Moreover, this experience 
also makes clear that even once a higher status is reached, the EU may still have to fight for its 
place at the table to make sure the upgrade is given full effect. Consequently the Union has 
adopted a more cautious and deliberate approach to similar efforts in other international 
organizations, especially those in the UN system. Although UNGA Resolution 65/276 is touted 
as a diplomatic success, since 2011 there has been no comparable effort to replicate the EU’s 
upgraded status in other international organizations or UN bodies. 
 
B. EXTENSION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
 
This does not mean, however, that the EU’s ambitions to improve its status in the UN framework 
have been entirely crushed. As illustrated by the Strategy, Commission services and the EEAS 
are still evaluating and promoting options to remedy the perceived impediments for effective 
Union representation in UN bodies. Nevertheless, the Barroso-Ashton-Strategy follows a 
significantly more cautious approach compared to similar EU communications dating from 
before the UNGA status upgrade. Written with a view to eventual EC membership in UN bodies, 
the Commission’s 2003 Communication ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The 
Choice of Multilateralism’ boldly demanded that the EC ‘should be given the possibility to 
participate fully in the work of UN bodies where matters of Community competence are 
concerned, and Member States should contribute effectively towards this’, 45  and stated – 
referring to EC membership in the FAO46 and the Codex Alimentarius – that ‘[t]his option should 
also be pursued for other relevant organisations that belong to the UN system’.47 Almost 10 
years later, the Barroso-Ashton-Strategy is far less ambitious. It avoids a clear commitment to 
any fixed negotiation goal and merely refers to the ‘improvement of the EU status and its 
alignment with the objectives of the EU Treaties’.48 For the time being, full participation of the 
EU in the UN framework as a member organization seems to have been abandoned as the final 
aim, giving way to a strategy of piecemeal steps towards modest upgrades wherever these 
appear to be legally and politically feasible.  
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One of the ways forward recommended by the Barroso-Ashton-Strategy is the application of 
Resolution 65/276 in UNGA subsidiary organs.49 In particular, the Strategy recommends to 
focus, among others, on the HRC and to avoid ‘reopening the resolution, under which 
[subsidiary bodies] are not explicitly covered’.50 
 
The HRC, which in 2006 replaced the UN Commission on Human Rights,51 is a body of 47 
elected UN Member States, tasked with the promotion of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. It addresses cases of human rights violations, provides recommendations, and 
monitors the fulfilment of each state’s human rights obligations through the universal periodic 
review (‘UPR’). As one of the foremost global human rights fora it is of significant importance for 
the Union’s external action.52  
 
While fundamental rights have been enshrined in EU primary law since the Maastricht Treaty, 
and the Union adopted a non-binding Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, it is only with the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty that the EU has reached the ‘high point of its engagement 
with human rights’.53 Not only does Article 6 TEU pave the way for the EU’s accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and confer binding treaty force to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, Article 21 TEU defines human rights and fundamental freedoms as guiding 
principles and objectives of the EU’s external action. Human rights are nowadays regarded as 
the ‘silver thread running through all EU action both at home and abroad’.54 In mid-2012 the EU 
appointed its first Special Representative for Human Rights, 55  and adopted a ‘Strategic 
Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’56 in which it ‘underlines the 
leading role of the UN Human Rights Council in addressing urgent cases of human rights 
violations’ and pledges to ‘contribute vigorously to the effective functioning of the Council’.57 
More specifically, items 9(a) and 23(b) of the Action Plan single out the HRC as a forum for the 
EU to promote economic, social and cultural rights and the freedom of religion or belief. 
Furthermore, the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law ranked consistently 
as one of the EU’s priorities during UNGA sessions.58 
 
The EU was a strong supporter for the establishment of the HRC since the idea first emerged in 
the 2004 sessions of the Commission on Human Rights, quickly endorsing the initiative for its 
establishment.59 ‘Welcom[ing] the presentation of a proposal reflecting the primacy of human 
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rights by the creation of a Human Rights Council’,60 the EU actively lobbied for the realization of 
its vision of the Council, which foresaw not only the creation of a standing body, possibly with 
the rank of a main organ of the UN, but whose membership should also be elected by a two 
thirds majority of the UNGA and be smaller in numbers, admitting only those states which 
demonstrated genuine interest in the promotion of human rights.61 Although the EU eventually 
had to compromise on many of its positions, it commented favourably on the final outcome and 
welcomed the HRC as an improvement over the Commission on Human Rights.62 The Union 
has remained an active supporter of the HRC ever since, participating extensively in the 2009-
2011 review process,63 supporting special procedures and the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, and proposing or supporting resolutions, in particular focusing on the 
freedom of religion or belief, the rights of the child, freedom of expression and country 
situations. Despite several recent successes,64 the Union’s impact at the HRC has often been 
described as marginal due to its inability, at least until recently, to forge cross-regional 
coalitions. This was caused by a lack of credibility in light of the Union’s persistent ‘double-
standards problem’, but also by its inflexible negotiation practice, defensive stance and 
insufficient outreach.65  
 
Effective EU participation is among others hindered by its legal status in the HRC. Full 
membership is only open to UN Member States. The Union has observer status, meaning that it 
cannot vote or sponsor resolutions, and while it has the right to make interventions, it may not 
do so in the speaking slots for states.66 The EU thus remains dependent on the representation 
by a Member State, in particular by the rotating Council Presidency. Even after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Union’s participation in the HRC is clogged by cumbersome 
internal coordination processes, which often focus on burden sharing rather than on substantive 
issues.67 This heavy focus on the internal process often leaves insufficient time and resources 
to gather support for EU positions and to build successful coalitions. The necessary internal 
coordination also reduces the Union’s flexibility during negotiations and with regard to new and 
unforeseen developments. Nevertheless, caution should be exercised to regard a status 
upgrade as a panacea that will solve all of the abovementioned issues. On the contrary, the 
Union must avoid contributing to the persistent bloc dynamics in the Council. In parallel with 
efforts to improve its status in the Council, it should fully seize the possibilities offered by EU 
Member States participating in the Council, which can support the Union’s message and bring 
invaluable expertise and third country networks.68  
 
While there appear to be no plans to eventually aim for full EU membership in the HRC, the 
Barroso-Ashton-Strategy considers to promote the extension of Resolution 65/276 and thereby 
to grant the EU enhanced participation rights. This would permit the Union to participate in the 
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work of the HRC ‘in its own right’, thus aligning its external representation with the requirements 
of Article 221 TFEU. However, the question remains whether it is legally and politically feasible 
to extend the application of Resolution 65/276 to the HRC. Adoption of the Resolution in the 
UNGA alone was not sufficient to modify the procedures of the HRC, given that the competence 
to decide on the granting of observer status and the modalities of participation rests with the 
Council.69 Participation of and consultation with observers in the HRC is governed by Rule 7(a) 
of its Rules of Procedure which provides: 
 
The Council shall apply the rules of procedure established for committees of the General 
Assembly, as applicable, unless subsequently otherwise decided by the Assembly or the 
Council, and the participation of and consultation with observers, including States that 
are not members of the Council, the specialized agencies, other intergovernmental 
organizations and national human rights institutions, as well as non-governmental 
organizations, shall be based on arrangements, including Economic and Social Council 
resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996, and practices observed by the Commission on 
Human Rights, while ensuring the most effective contribution of these entities. 
 
Enhanced participation rights for the Union would be within reach, if, firstly, Resolution 65/276 
was part of the rules of procedure established for the UNGA committees and if, secondly, the 
UNGA and the HRC did not decide against its application. As to the first point, in a narrow 
reading the term ‘rules of procedure’ in Rule 7(a) of the HRC’s Rules of Procedure might refer 
only to the UNGA’s rules of procedure sensu stricto, which in Section XIII contain provisions for 
the proceedings in the committees.70 A broader understanding of the term, however, would not 
depend on the formal status of a provision, but on its substance, thereby widening the scope to 
include resolutions which govern the procedure of the Assembly and its committees. This would 
also include the various resolutions granting participation rights to non-member states and 
observers – matters on which the UNGA’s rules of procedure sensu stricto are silent. Given that 
Resolution 65/276 contains ‘modalities […] for the participation of the representatives of the 
European Union, in its capacity as observer, in the sessions and work of the General Assembly 
and its committees’,71 it can be regarded as forming part of the rules of procedure referred to in 
Rule 7(a) of the HRC’s rules of procedure and would therefore find application in the HRC.  
 
Secondly, however, the question remains as to whether the UNGA or the HRC ‘subsequently 
[decided] otherwise’. Neither body adopted an explicit decision against the application of 
Resolution 65/276 in the HRC. They may have done so implicitly, though. At first glance, the 
sweeping title of the Resolution (‘Participation of the European Union in the work of the United 
Nations’) suggests a broad scope of application across the entire spectrum of UN bodies.72 But 
it was clearly not the intention of the drafters to modify the EU’s status in the UN framework in 
general, firstly because this would entail a restriction in those fora where the EU obtained full 
participant or membership status and thus even broader participation rights, secondly because 
the UNGA lacks the competence to set the rules of procedure for the various UN bodies and 
fora.73 Instead, Resolution 65/276 limits its application to the ‘sessions and work of the General 
Assembly and its committees and working groups, in international meetings and conferences 
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convened under the auspices of the Assembly and in United Nations conferences’.74 While this 
list is not explicitly declared to be exhaustive, it reveals a conscious inclusion of several 
subsidiary organs, namely committees and working groups, while other subsidiary bodies, such 
as boards, commissions, councils and panels, were omitted. It could therefore be argued that 
Resolution 65/276 implies a decision by the UNGA against its application in the HRC, in the 
terms of Rules 7(a) of the HRC’s rules of procedure.  
 
Independent of the legal aspects, the political feasibility of a status upgrade remains doubtful. 
Significant resistance, both externally and internally, against an enhanced EU status at the HRC 
has caused the current cautious approach of the Union. States, including the EU Member 
States, continue to regard human rights as a state prerogative and hesitate to accept ‘that 
actors at the level of the EU […] take over the role of state actors’. 75  The extension of 
Resolution 65/276 to the HRC therefore remains a rather distant possibility, which seems also 
reflected in the fact that it has completely disappeared in the 2013 information note on the 
implementation of the Barroso-Ashton-Strategy.76  
 
IV. THE STATUS OF THE EU IN THE WIDER UN SYSTEM 
 
The EU has also pursued the objective of improving its representation at other UN agencies. In 
this regard the EU is faced with an important question: which bodies should it prioritize? The 
Barroso-Ashton-Strategy proposes a set of criteria based on interest and prospect: status 
enhancement should be sought in those organizations that have, both, a ‘strategic or economic 
interest’ for the EU and/or ‘impact on policy areas where the EU has important competences’, 
and in which ‘an upgrade appears realistic in the short to medium term’.77 Regrettably, neither of 
those factors is explained in more detail. It thus remains unclear which criteria the Strategy 
applies to determine the feasibility of a status upgrade. Also, the interest criterion is by far too 
broad to allow for a workable prioritization of Union efforts. There remain very few issues dealt 
with by the UN that are not of strategic or economic relevance to the EU or which do not impact 
areas of important Union competences. This criterion, too, would have benefited from a more 
thorough definition in order to make the selection of priority organizations more transparent. The 
Barroso-Ashton-Strategy’s recommendation for resumed efforts with regard to the EU’s 
participation in the FAO and for a status upgrade, among others, in the IMO and IAEA, therefore 
appears rather random. Furthermore, UNESCO, where the EU had been granted enhanced 
observer status for the negotiation of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions, is not mentioned in the Barroso-Ashton-Strategy. This raises 
questions, as it will be demonstrated below that this could serve as a precedent for a new 
approach of ad hoc upgraded EU participation for temporally restricted and closely defined 
purposes. 
 
A. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (FAO) 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is among those organizations for which the 
Strategy instructs Commission services and the EEAS ‘to sustain their efforts with a view to a 
positive outcome’, given that ‘efforts to upgrade the EU status or improve the position of the EU 
within the existing arrangements are underway and progress is being made’.78 It thereby refers 
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to the ongoing revision of the internal arrangements between the Commission and the Council. 
The 2013 Commission Communication on ‘The role of the European Union in the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (‘FAO Communication’)79 foresees not 
only upgrades of the EU’s status at the FAO, it also provides for more flexible internal 
coordination procedures and more robust external representation of the Union – thereby 
immediately prompting resistance on the side of EU Member States.  
 
The FAO is the second oldest UN specialized agency, founded against the background of the 
Second World War, which had given rise to the idea that ‘international cooperation between 
nation states and the international regulation and supervision of economic sectors with strategic 
significance […] could act as safeguards against future conflicts’.80 Tasked with eradicating 
hunger, combatting poverty and promoting the sustainable use of natural resources, the FAO 
provides a network and forum of discussion for the dissemination of knowledge, expertise and 
up-to-date information.81 
 
Agriculture is one of the core competences of the EU, and has been so since its earliest days, 
when the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community tasked the EEC with the 
creation of a common agricultural policy (‘CAP’).82 It encompasses a range of policy areas 
which overlap with the work of the FAO, in particular food safety, rural development and the 
environment. The importance of the CAP for the EU is clearly illustrated by its financial weight, 
which will – with a budget of 408.3 billion EUR (in current prices) – amount to a 38% share of 
the EU’s overall budget in the years 2014-2020. 83  The work of the FAO additionally 
encompasses fisheries policies, for which the EU also shares competence with the Member 
States (Article 4(2)(d) TFEU). 
 
The first contacts between FAO and the Union coincided with the establishment of the EEC and 
the transferal of agriculture competences from domestic to Community level. While a first 
agreement between EEC and FAO had already been drafted in 1959, it was an exchange of 
letters between the President of the European Commission and the Director General of the FAO 
which in 1962 established principles of interaction between the two organizations. 84  The 
Commission participated as an observer in meetings of the FAO and obtained enhanced 
observer status in 1970. Still, its participation rights were deemed insufficient to effectively 
exercise its extensive competences.85 The Commission deplored in particular its inability to 
table proposals and to fully participate in the policy making of the FAO and the work of its 
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technical bodies.86 Already in 1978 the Commission thus introduced its aim of EC accession to 
the FAO,87 but it was only on 22 October 1990 that the Council requested the opening of 
accession negotiations, which were launched on 7 February 1991.88 Accession of the European 
Community (‘EC’) as a full member was without precedent in the UN framework and required an 
amendment of the FAO constitution, to include a so-called ‘regional economic integration 
organization’ (‘REIO’) clause. The negotiation process had to overcome concerns, both on the 
side of the EU Member States, which were reluctant to give up rights, and on the side of other 
FAO State Parties, which feared to endanger the intergovernmental character of the UN by 
setting a precedent.89 On 25 November 1991, however, the Council finally requested admission, 
which was accepted the next day by the FAO Conference. 
 
Since then the EU has developed into the largest contributor of voluntary funding to the FAO.90 
Additional agreements have been concluded to align and strengthen the cooperation between 
both organizations. In 2004 FAO and EC adopted a strategic partnership agreement, to achieve 
more strategic cooperation in selected policy areas. 91  In June 2011 the EU concluded a 
‘Strategic Programmatic Framework on Food Security and Nutrition’ with the three Rome-based 
agencies, FAO, World Food Programme (‘WFP’) and International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (‘IFAD’), ‘to harmonize and coordinate the implementation of […] food security 
and humanitarian food assistance goals’.92 Still, the role of the EU in the work of the FAO is 
evaluated controversially: while some detect a ‘true partnership’ between both organizations,93 
others posit that the FAO values the EU for its wallet, rather than for its policy cooperation.94 
 
Although the EU has obtained the status of a Member Organization95 at the FAO, its effective 
representation continues to face serious challenges. These result firstly from the fact that, as a 
Member Organization, the EU does not enjoy the same rights as Members: it may not hold 
office in the Conference, the Council and their subsidiary bodies,96 it has no voting rights for 
elective places97 or budget matters,98 and no participation rights in the restricted committees99 
and the bodies dealing with the internal working of the conference.100 In its FAO Communication 
the Commission thus declared a need to address the limitations of the FAO Constitution in order 
to achieve coherence with the Lisbon Treaty and to achieve full and equal EU participation.101 
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Given that any changes to the current modalities require a two third majority in the biannual 
FAO Conference, the prospects of this initiative appear dim. 
 
An additional complicating factor lies in the phenomenon of mixity. Since the EU acceded to the 
FAO as a Member Organization alongside its Member States, speaking and voting rights have 
to be exercised on an alternative basis. 102  This causes a twofold problem of external 
transparency and internal coordination.  
 
The former entails that the EU carries an additional burden of ensuring transparency vis-à-vis 
the FAO concerning its division of competences with the Member States. Under the FAO 
Constitution the EU was thus required to submit a declaration of competence in order to 
disclose its internal division of competences to the State Parties of the FAO,103 and to notify the 
Director-General of any subsequent changes.104 The EU’s current declaration, however, still 
dates back to 1994, despite the significant reforms that have since been undertaken.105 It was 
only with the 2013 FAO Communication that the Commission submitted an updated draft 
declaration to the Council, aiming to bring the present version in line with the provisions of the 
Lisbon Treaty.106 The draft is currently under review.107 It has already attracted criticism from the 
side of EU Member States, among others for not including ‘any recognition of the extent to 
which the EU has not exercised its competence under shared competence areas’. 108 
Furthermore, the FAO Constitution obliges the EU or its Member States to indicate before each 
meeting the division of competences for each agenda item and to declare which entity shall 
vote.109 Given that this constitutes a significant additional burden, the Commission stated in its 
Communication that it considered ‘the systematic submission of such an information note [to be] 
not required for meetings or specific agenda points thereof where either a vote is not envisaged 
or the division of competence between the EU and its Member States results directly from the 
present declaration of competence’. 110  This view appears questionable and has triggered 
criticism from Member State side. 111  The General Rules of the FAO explicitly require an 
indication of competence ‘before any meeting of the Organization’.112 Also, the new Declaration 
of Competences, which adds little if any information to the provisions of the EU Treaties, is too 
vague to allow third states to determine by which competence a specific agenda item is 
covered.113 This holds especially true for the area of shared competences, where up-to-date and 
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tailored information notes can present the extent to which the Union has exercised its 
competences. 
 
The biggest hurdle for effective EU participation at the FAO remains, however, the cumbersome 
internal coordination process between Member States and EU institutions. In order to facilitate 
the procedure, the Commission and Council agreed in the internal ‘Arrangement Between the 
Council and the Commission Regarding Preparation for FAO Meetings and Statements and 
Voting’ that the EU exercises speaking and voting rights if the issue falls in the area of its 
exclusive competence and that the EU Member State holding the rotating Council Presidency is 
competent in case of Member State competence. 114  If an issue falls, both, under EU and 
Member State competence, a common position should be sought, based on whether the ‘thrust’ 
of the issue falls in exclusive EU or Member States competence.115 In case of disagreement the 
matter will be referred to the COREPER.116 This Arrangement has not only failed to avoid legal 
disputes in the past,117 it also has not sufficiently streamlined the cumbersome process in which 
statements by the EU or the EU and its Member States are negotiated and agreed upon. Time-
consuming discussions of procedural issues leave insufficient opportunity to focus on the 
substance, and weaken the EU’s effective participation in the FAO. In an attempt to solve this 
problem, the Commission proposed a set of revised ‘Arrangements between the Council and 
the Commission regarding the Exercise of Membership Rights of the European Union and its 
Member States in the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)’,118 in Annex 2 of its 2013 FAO 
Communication. According to the draft arrangements, full statements shall in the future only be 
prepared in exceptional cases, while the new default modus for EU positions in the FAO shall 
be the one of ‘lines to take’.119 Although this would ensure greater flexibility for the external 
representative of the Union, fears of ‘unscripted interventions with which Member States do not 
fully agree’ have already been voiced120 and indeed the additional effort, which Member States 
might invest to ‘ensure lines to take [are] sufficiently tightly drafted to reduce these risks’121 
might negate any hopes of a more efficient coordination process. This is strongly suggested by 
a recent incident at the FAO, when the Commission representative deviated from the exact 
wording of a statement, which had been previously agreed during the Coordination Working 
Party, omitting or exchanging words that had been particularly contentious.122 Nineteen EU 
Member States subsequently issued a joint statement in which they expressed their deep regret 
about the incident and underlined that agreed statements should be fully respected. 123  A 
working method which accords a higher degree of flexibility to the Union representative might 
therefore fail to win the necessary support in the Council. 
 
The example of the FAO shows that even though the Union obtained full membership status, its 
participation in the work of the organization is still lagging behind.124 This is not only due to the 
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limitations which the FAO Constitution and the General Rules of Procedure impose on member 
organizations, but primarily results from EU internal procedures and quarrels. The Barroso-
Ashton-Strategy lists the FAO in the category of those international organizations where the 
prospects to improve the position of the Union are good, referring to the ongoing revision of the 
1991 Arrangements between Council and Commission. In light of the above analysis, this 
evaluation of the Commission’s FAO Communication might prove too optimistic. A two thirds 
majority of the FAO Conference for the expansion of EU competences appears difficult to 
achieve, and EU Member States’ fears of competence creep and loss of status might prevent 
the adoption of more flexible internal agreements. 
 
B. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO) 
 
The IMO, a specialized agency of the UN, is an organization where the EU may seek to 
upgrade its status in the near future.125 It is one of the organizations that have been prioritised 
for a status upgrade in the Barroso-Ashton-Strategy, based on the abovementioned criteria of 
interest and prospect.126 The Union increasingly puts focus on the work of the organization, 
especially with regard to working on international environmental issues (e.g. reduction in CO2 
emissions) and issues of ship safety.127 While the EU currently has an emissions trading system 
that covers other fields of transport, including airlines operating in EU Member States,128 it has 
not yet implemented a system that regulates emissions from maritime transportation. On 28 
June 2013 the Commission set out its plan to integrate maritime emissions into the EU’s policy 
for reducing its domestic greenhouse gas emissions.129 Despite the slow pace of discussions 
within the IMO on this issue, the Union still views the IMO as the best international forum to 
regulate emissions from shipping, which currently constitute around 3% of global greenhouse 
gas emissions.130 The EU also plays an active role in other areas relevant to the IMO, such as 
maritime pollution and maritime safety. Apart from EU legislation in these fields, in 2003 the 
European Maritime Safety Agency (‘EMSA’) was established to provide specialised technical 
assistance. Lastly, the EU and the IMO are both becoming active in the field of maritime security 
and piracy131, a topic that is increasingly important to the Union from a security standpoint. 
Besides, work undertaken by the IMO has led to amendments of the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (‘SOLAS Convention’) and the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code (‘ISPS Code’). Thus, interests as well as the significant EU legislation in 
fields covered by the work of the IMO support an enhanced status of the Union in the work of 
this organization. 
 
The European Commission (not the Community or the Union) has been an observer at the IMO 
since 1974. Although the Commission recommended to the Council to pursue full membership 
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of the then EC in both the IMO and the ICAO back in 2002,132 this was not supported by the EU 
Member States.133 In the face of opposition from EU Member States which are IMO members, 
the Commission is now seeking instead to change the Commission’s representation to that of 
the ‘European Union’ in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty. There are also significant external 
constraints that prevent the EU from becoming a full IMO Member.134 The IMO Convention is 
only open to states,135 and EU membership would require the inclusion of a REIO clause, as 
was the case with the FAO. There is little incentive, however, to go through the process of treaty 
modification that would be necessary to amend the Convention, which would require the 
ratification of two-thirds of the IMO membership.136  
 
The IMO therefore represents yet another organization where, even though the Union has 
significant competences, legislation and interests in the fields dealt with by this IO, its lack of 
membership means that it must continue to rely on its Member States. This can cause problems 
within the EU’s legal order. When the EU is not a formal member of an IO where significant 
Union competences are concerned, this can create a gap in legal obligations between the EU 
and its Member States, since only the Member States are formally bound under international 
law. For instance, in the ATAA case the EU’s non-membership of ICAO, another UN specialized 
agency, meant that the EU was not formally bound by a significant body of international law 
regulating air transport.137 EU membership in international organizations such as ICAO and IMO 
would go a long way to filling this gap. Moreover the Union’s membership in global regulatory 
bodies such as IMO is important for it to safeguard its own significant regulatory framework. 
However, the prospects for status upgrade look rather dim, as illustrated by the 2013 
information note on the implementation of the Barroso-Ashton-Strategy, which states that ‘little 
or no progress could be achieved due to a changed political context’ and recommends that 
‘[s]ervices will sustain their efforts in order to unlock the situation’.138 
 
C. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) 
 
The IAEA, although a separate international organization, is associated to the UN family, and is 
also a body where the EU has identified a priority in upgrading its status.139 The Union is 
strongly committed to the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,140 and has 
worked actively in multilateral fora to prevent states such as Iran from acquiring nuclear 
weapons capabilities141 and to deal with the nuclear weapons programme of North Korea. Talks 
with Iran over its nuclear issues have been one of the key priorities of HR/VP Catherine Ashton 
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as part of the E3+3. The Joint Plan of Action142 on Iran’s nuclear activities, concluded in Geneva 
on 24 November 2013, establishes the IAEA as being responsible for the verification of nuclear-
related measures. The EU is also actively involved in issues of nuclear safety, which were 
brought back to the world’s attention after the Fukushima disaster in Japan. While the Union has 
worked on these issues in other fora, most notably within the UN Security Council, the IAEA 
also plays a crucial role in these fields.  
On 25 January 2013 a meeting was held in Brussels bringing together officials from the EEAS, 
the European Commission and the IAEA for the first time, to focus on areas of co-operation in 
the areas of nuclear safety, nuclear security, nuclear applications, technical cooperation, 
nuclear energy and nuclear safeguards.143 It is evident that closer co-operation between the EU 
and IAEA would benefit both organizations. The EU is a major contributor to the IAEA, both in 
terms of financial aid and technical assistance. The gross overall contribution to the IAEA for the 
period of 2007-2013 was € 111.5 million.144 On 21 June 2013 the EU and IAEA signed a 
contribution agreement under the 2012 Annual Action Programme of the Instrument for Nuclear 
Safety Cooperation (INSC) whereby the EU would contribute € 9,260,000 for technical 
cooperation and nuclear safety. Moreover, many of the issues dealt with by the IAEA are of key 
importance to EU domestic and foreign policy, most notably the Union’s engagement with 
issues such as nuclear non-proliferation.  
 
The EU itself has no formal observer status at the IAEA although Euratom is an observer. The 
relationship is based upon an agreement between Euratom and the IAEA, which has been in 
force since 1 January 1976 (Cooperation Agreement 1975) and whereby Euratom is invited to 
the annual sessions of the General Conference of the Agency but does not have the right to 
vote. There are several options available to the EU for improving its status at the IAEA. The first 
would require the EU to attain observer status alongside Euratom. This would probably require 
an agreement between the EU and Euratom concerning competences and clarifying the 
relationship between the existing IAEA-Euratom Agreement. Another option would be to update 
the IAEA-Euratom agreement to allow for dual EU-Euratom representation in their respective 
fields of competence. The 2013 information note on the implementation of the Barroso-Ashton-
Strategy favourably reported progress made in the internal debates, and stated that 
‘Commission services and the EEAS are in the process of assessing the most promising 
approach to obtain an appropriate status for the EU’.145 Either way, there is still an important 
requirement for the EU and Euratom “to ensure consistency between [their] external 
relations.”146  
 
D. UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO) 
  
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (‘UNESCO’) is an example 
for a body that is not mentioned in the Barroso-Ashton-Strategy although it might arguably fulfil 
the interest and prospect criteria. It additionally serves as an interesting example of an ad hoc 
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status upgrade strategy, which has the potential for wider application throughout the UN 
framework. 
  
UNESCO, a UN specialized agency, was founded in 1945 to foster peace ‘on the basis of 
humanity’s moral and intellectual solidarity’. 147  Aiming to avoid conflicts by strengthening 
international cooperation in the fields of culture, education, science and communication, its work 
focuses on the dissemination of knowledge and ideas, the protection of the world’s heritage and 
cultural diversity, and the promotion of scientific cooperation and quality of education.148 
 
Cultural policy was not an obvious competence for a regional integration organization which was 
initially primarily economic in nature and consequently it was not part of the EU’s portfolio before 
1993. The EEC impacted the Member States’ authority in the cultural domain only incidentally, 
in the context of the freedom of movement of cultural goods, services and people.149  The 
Maastricht Treaty introduced a cultural competence into the Union’s primary law. Article 3(p) of 
the EC Treaty tasked the Community with ‘a contribution […] to the flowering of the cultures of 
the Member States’ but its responsibility remained deferential towards the Member States, and 
did not exceed the competence to encourage cooperation between them and to support and 
supplement their action. This wording was retained in the current Article 167 TFEU. Article 6(c) 
TFEU provides that in the area of culture, the Union shall merely ‘support, coordinate or 
supplement the actions of the Member States’, and Article 2(5) TFEU stipulates that Union 
action in the cultural field will neither supersede Member States’ competences nor that the 
adoption of legally binding acts will entail harmonisation of the domestic law. The explicit 
competence for EU engagement in UNESCO is enshrined in Article 167(3) TFEU,150 which 
states that the ‘Union […] shall foster cooperation with […] the competent international 
organisations in the sphere of culture’. A similar development can be traced for EU policy in the 
field of education, which found its first basis in a 1976 Action Programme,151 before being 
formally introduced in EU primary law with the Maastricht Treaty. EU competences in research, 
on the other hand, were already included in the ECSC and Euratom treaties, and while the EEC 
treaty contained only narrow research competences in the field of agriculture, its sweeping 
Article 235 was used to launch a series of research programmes. The Union’s education 
competence has remained confined to actions that ‘support, coordinate or supplement’ Member 
States’ initiatives (Article 6(e), 165 TFEU), whereas the Union enjoys a ‘parallel’ competence in 
the field of research (Article 4(3), 179 et seq.). 
 
Remarkably, formal relations between the EEC and UNESCO were established at a time when 
the Community enjoyed only limited competences in the research area, and when culture and 
education still rested exclusively with the Member States. A first exchange of letters between 
the President of the Commission and the UNESCO Director-General in 1964 established 
methods for closer cooperation to achieve common goals, including most importantly the 
reciprocal invitation of observers to participate in the work of the respective bodies.152 A second 
exchange of letters in 1972/1973 determined those areas where UNESCO and EEC 
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involvement overlapped, and designated a number of priority areas. In February 1996, the 
European Commission and UNESCO signed an agreement detailing the methods of their 
cooperation, particularly focusing on technical assistance and joint projects,153 followed by an 
extension of the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement between the EC and the 
UN to UNESCO in 2004. 154  In 2012 the EU and UNESCO concluded a Memorandum of 
Understanding in which they laid down principles and objectives for their partnership, identified 
priorities and made arrangements for cooperation, including provisions on reciprocal invitations 
to meetings and working groups and on mutual information and consultation.155  
 
Despite its longstanding involvement in the work of UNESCO, its financial impact and the 
increasingly close partnership between both organizations, the EU’s status generally remains 
one of a simple observer, restricting it to a predominantly passive role in the debates held in the 
framework of UNESCO. While Union representatives may participate in the meetings of the 
organization’s bodies and make oral interventions, they do not have the right to vote, to submit 
proposals or amendments thereto. 156  These limited possibilities for participation were 
considered to be insufficient by the Commission with regard to the negotiation of the 2005 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.157 The 
Commission had supported the initiative since its earliest days, fully endorsing the 2001 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity and Action Plan and ranking the 
‘[p]reservation and promotion of cultural diversity […] among the founding principles of the 
European model’.158 In light of its status limitations, the Commission requested a negotiating 
mandate from the Council,159 which was supported by the European Parliament and adopted by 
the Council in November 2004.160 Thereby the Commission was given the mandate to take part 
in the negotiations of the Convention on behalf of the Community, as far as EC competences 
were concerned, and to negotiate alongside the Member States whenever a matter fell in an 
area of shared competence. A subsequently adopted Code of Conduct detailed the division of 
work between the Member States and the Commission, according to which the Presidency 
would represent the common positions of the Member States and the Commission would 
represent Community positions.161  
 
While the internal dimension of EC participation in the negotiations was thus quickly and 
smoothly established, the external dimension caused more difficulties. A first proposal by the 
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Council Presidency in September 2004 to grant the Commission extended rights for the purpose 
of negotiating the Convention was included in the provisional agenda of the 170th session of 
UNESCO’s Executive Board,162 where it failed to gain sufficient support. The State Parties were 
particularly concerned about setting a precedent and endangering the intergovernmental 
character of the organization. Additionally, the debate was characterized by a widespread lack 
of knowledge about the involvement of regional multilateral organizations in the UN framework, 
in particular through REIO clauses, and the practice of other UN bodies with regard to the EC.163 
The Commission thus remained restricted to its usual observer role for the initial negotiations. In 
March 2005 the Council Presidency again introduced the matter to the Executive Board’s 
agenda, highlighting the insufficiency of the EC’s status to fully participate in the negotiations 
and to safeguard its interests. 164  A group of eight EU Member States165  submitted a draft 
decision, which would grant regional economic integration organizations active participation 
rights ‘in the same manner as full participants’, comprising in particular ‘the right to speak, to 
reply, to put forward proposals and amendments at the formal meetings, and to take part in the 
committees, working groups, formal or informal meetings set up in the course of the work 
relating to this Convention, the European Community having its own nameplate’ but ‘excluding 
the right to vote’.166 The draft decision proved to be particularly contentious and neither the 
Special Committee of the Executive Board nor its informal working group could come to an 
agreement. 167  Finally the Special Committee submitted a revised draft, which had been 
proposed by the Chairperson of the informal working group, to the Executive Board. The draft 
contained significantly amended language. In order to appease fears of setting a precedent, the 
amended draft highlighted that the extended rights were only granted ‘on an exceptional basis 
[…] while maintaining [the] observer status’ of the Community.168 The draft also omitted the 
specific list of rights included in the EU Member States’ proposal and restricted the scope of the 
application to the EC alone, not extending it to regional economic integration organizations in 
general. The decision which was finally adopted by the Executive Board was even narrower. 
Every comparison to the participation rights of full participants was avoided; instead the EC was 
granted the right to ‘participate actively and as fully as appropriate’.169 Furthermore, a time limit 
was introduced, restricting the enhanced rights to no more than the intergovernmental meeting 
of experts which was held between 25 May and 4 June 2005. The Council Presidency ensured 
afterwards to immediately indicate the list of rights that it deemed to be covered by its 
‘enhanced observer status’ of which the Executive Board took note without objection.170  
 
Although the EC draft was thus considerably watered down in the final decision, the ‘selective 
upgrade’ of its observer status nevertheless was a significant achievement for the Community. It 
allowed the Commission to actively participate as a negotiating party in a policy field that held 
particular internal significance, and to shape the content of the Convention, among others by 
successfully advocating for the inclusion of a REIO clause.171 Even though the final decision of 
the Executive Board and the previous debates expressly stated that the Community’s enhanced 
observer status could not be regarded as setting a precedent, it importantly confirmed a practice 
that had been launched two years earlier, when the WHO granted REIOs active participation 
rights in the negotiations of the 2003 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. It also raised 
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awareness among the State Parties of UNESCO for both the particularities of the division of 
competences between the Community and its Member States, and the participation of REIOs in 
the UN framework in general. The EC quickly acceded to the Convention, although its 
implementation record shows symptoms of a ‘double standard’, with strong results in external 
affairs and a comparatively weaker approach in the internal dimension.172 So far, the ‘selective 
enhanced observer status’ has not been pursued in other UN bodies and there was no 
opportunity to repeat the initiative with regard to subsequent UNESCO conventions. Tellingly 
the Barroso-Ashton-Strategy does not even consider this option for upgrading EU status in the 
UN framework, aiming for general status enhancements instead. It thereby overlooks a very 
promising and practical option to boost the EU’s status ad hoc in those cases which are 
particularly relevant for the Union and where the Union could make a real difference in the 
shaping and the subsequent implementation of an international instrument. The process leading 
towards a temporarily or thematically enhanced observer status requires less time and 
diplomatic effort and might thus yield a more favourable effort/outcome ratio. At the same time, 
through setting positive examples of active EU participation in the UN framework, the Union 
could also pave the way for more permanent status upgrades. The lack of ambition and 
imagination of the Barroso-Ashton-Strategy is therefore also perceptible in its exclusive focus on 
the traditional goal of general status enhancement, ignoring prominent alternative paths that the 
recent practice in UNESCO and WHO has demonstrated. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Although cooperation with the UN is a significant political priority for the EU, efforts to enhance 
the Union’s representation in the various UN bodies have encountered stumbling blocks. The 
EU continues to deal with problems regarding representation in those fora where the EU 
Member States remain highly active, due to disagreements concerning the distribution of tasks, 
in particular with regard to speaking rights and negotiating mandates. Moreover, the EU’s efforts 
to upgrade its status at the UN, as illustrated by the diplomatic saga around the adoption of 
UNGA Resolution 65/276, did not go as smoothly as planned, and the gaps between the EU’s 
status in most UN bodies and its competences and priorities significantly hinder the effective 
representation of the Union.  
 
Status enhancements, aligning the Union’s internal and external dimensions, thus remain a 
focal point of the EU’s diplomatic activity at the UN. The 2012 Barroso-Ashton-Strategy 
nevertheless reveals a significant decline in ambition, in that it opts for an approach of 
piecemeal, modest status upgrades, where its predecessor contained a clear commitment to 
aim for full participation of the Union at the UN level. The Strategy also lacks the precision that 
would be necessary to effectively guide the Union’s diplomatic efforts towards better EU 
representation in the UN. This concerns in particular the overly broad set of criteria established 
to identify priority organizations, which provides little explanation, both on the inclusion of the 
selected bodies and on the omission of other fora. In this regard the Strategy’s silence on 
UNESCO is particularly striking, given that it is an organization which not only appears to fit the 
broad selection criteria but also provides a promising example of a ‘selective’ status upgrade 
that might inform the strategy for other UN bodies. Moreover, a closer look at the selected 
priority organizations raises doubts about the plausibility of the Commission’s assessment of 
whether ‘an upgrade appears realistic in the short to medium term’.173 This concerns not only 
the HRC, where an extension of UNGA Resolution 65/276 to the HRC appears to be neither 
legally nor politically feasible, but also the FAO and the IMO. The Commission’s FAO 
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Communication has already triggered significant internal resistance by the Member States and 
moreover recommends enhancements of the Union’s status at the FAO, for which political 
support does not appear to be within reach. With regard to the IMO, the Commission itself 
reverted its positive assessment only a year later in its 2013 information note, reporting ‘little or 
no progress […] due to a changed political context’.174 Of the analysed bodies it is only with 
regard to the IAEA that a positive assessment of the prospect for status enhancement can 
cautiously be confirmed.  
 
If the EU is serious about its goal ‘to support and work for effective multilateralism, with the 
United Nations at its core’,175 then this involves the EU’s presence and involvement in the UN 
and the UN system. However, the EU not only remains faced with a series of internal and 
external obstacles as a participant within the UN and the UN system, barring it from taking up its 
leading role at the global level: it currently also lacks a convincing strategy to overcome them. 
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